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NATURALLY OCCURRING PREFERENCES AND EXOGENOUS
LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF RISK AVERSION
BY GLENN W. HARRISON, JOHN A. LIST, AND CHARLES TOWE1
Does individual behavior in a laboratory setting provide a reliable indicator of be-
havior in a naturally occurring setting? We consider this general methodological ques-
tion in the context of eliciting risk attitudes. The controls that are typically employed in
laboratory settings, such as the use of abstract lotteries, could lead subjects to employ
behavioral rules that differ from the ones they employ in the field. Because it is field
behavior that we are interested in understanding, those controls might be a confound
in themselves if they result in differences in behavior. We find that the use of artificial
monetary prizes provides a reliable measure of risk attitudes when the natural counter-
part outcome has minimal uncertainty, but that it can provide an unreliable measure
when the natural counterpart outcome has background risk. Behavior tended to be
moderately risk averse when artificial monetary prizes were used or when there was
minimal uncertainty in the natural nonmonetary outcome, but subjects drawn from the
same population were much more risk averse when their attitudes were elicited using
the natural nonmonetary outcome that had some background risk. These results are
consistent with conventional expected utility theory for the effects of background risk
on attitudes to risk.
KEYWORDS: Risk aversion, background risk, field experiments, laboratory experi-
ments.
ONE OF THE MAIN ATTRACTIONS of experimental methods is the control that
it provides over factors that could influence behavior. The ability to control
the environment allows the researcher to study the effects of treatments in
isolation and, hence, makes it easier to draw inferences as to what is influenc-
ing behavior. In most cases we are interested in making inferences about field
behavior. We hypothesize that there is a danger that the imposition of an ex-
ogenous laboratory control might make it harder, in some settings, to make
reliable inferences about field behavior. The reason is that the experimenter
might not understand something about the factor being controlled, and might
impose it in a way that is inconsistent with the way it arises naturally in the field
and that affects behavior.
We take as a case study the elicitation of measures of risk aversion, which
is arguably one of the most primitive characteristics of the standard specifica-
tion of utility functions.2 In the traditional paradigm, risk aversion is viewed in
1We are grateful to Michael Price for assistance with running the experiments and to Stef-
fen Andersen, a co-editor, and three referees for helpful comments. Harrison thanks the U.S.
National Science Foundation for research support under grant NSF/HSD 0527675. Support-
ing data and instructions are stored in the Experimental Sciences Digital Archive located at
http://exlab.bus.ucf.edu.
2The other is the characterization of preferences across arguments of the utility function that
are atemporal (e.g., beer and pizza) or time dated (e.g., beer today or beer tomorrow). We focus
on just one commodity and one time dating.
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terms of diminishing marginal utility of the final prize in some abstract lottery.3
The concept of a lottery here is just a metaphor for a real lottery, although in
practice the metaphor has been used as the primary vehicle for laboratory elici-
tation of risk attitudes. In general there is some commodity x and various levels
i of x, xi, that depend on some state of nature that occurs with a probability
pi that is known to the individual whose preferences are being elicited. Thus
the lottery is defined by {xi;pi}. Traditional measures of risk aversion are then
defined in terms of the curvature of the utility function with respect to x.
We consider the evaluation of risk attitudes in the field. This entails more
than just “leaving the classroom” and recruiting outside of a university setting,
as emphasized by Harrison and List (2004). In terms of sample composition,
it means finding subjects who deal with that type of uncertainty in varying de-
grees and trying to measure the extent of their field experience with uncer-
tainty. Moreover, it means developing stimuli that more closely match those
that the subjects have previously experienced, so that they can use whatever
heuristics they have developed for that commodity when making their choices.
Finally, it means developing ways to communicate probabilities that corre-
spond to the language with which the subjects are familiar. Thus, field experi-
mentation in this case (and in general) involves several simultaneous changes
from the lab setting with respect to subject recruitment and the development
of stimuli that match the field setting.
A second theme is the importance of “background risk” for the attitudes
toward a specific “foreground risk” that are elicited. In many field settings
it is not possible to artificially identify attitudes toward one risk source with-
out worrying about how the subjects view that risk as being correlated with
other risks. For example, mortality risks from alternative occupations tend to
be highly correlated with morbidity risks. It is implausible to ask subjects their
attitude toward one risk without some coherent explanation as to why a higher
3There is some debate as to whether the arguments of the utility function should be terminal
wealth, income, or prizes that are final outcomes from some specific choice. We offer an “agnos-
tic empirical argument” in Section 3 that the subjects behave as if lottery prizes; the argument.
Irrespective of the position that one takes on this debate, one can view our estimates of risk at-
titude as informative from two different perspectives. One is from the perspective of expected
utility theory in which utility is defined over lottery prizes; and the other is from prospect theory
(and related alternatives to standard theory) in which the value function is also defined over lot-
tery prizes. In the latter case one would also be interested in controls for probability weighting
and, if applicable, loss aversion; we include such controls subsequently. We recognize that some
prospect theory observers reject the view that expected utility can be defined coherently over lot-
tery prizes, and we further accept the view that if one defines utility over terminal wealth that there
are strong a priori arguments to expect subjects to be risk neutral over the lottery prizes used
here (Rabin (2000)). However, our objective is not to resolve this debate, even though we have
crisp views on the matter that accord with Cox and Sadiraj (2006) and Rubinstein (2002). Instead,
our goal is to inform a wide range of observers (those who use expected utility theory and view
utility as defined over lottery prizes, and those who use prospect theory) about the effect on risk
attitudes of our treatments.
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or lower level of that risk would not be associated with a higher or lower risk
of the other.
In the field experiment, which uses numismatists at a coin show as experi-
mental subjects, we focus on a well studied special case of this issue of multiple
risks: the response of decision-makers to the addition of independent back-
ground risk.4 Assuming expected-utility preferences and risk averse agents, the
addition of independent risk reduces welfare. More importantly for our pur-
poses, the literature has yielded a set of preferences that guarantee that the
addition of an unfair background risk to wealth reduces the certainty equiv-
alent of any other independent risk. That is, the addition of background risk
of this type makes risk averse individuals behave in a more risk averse way
with respect to any other independent risk. Gollier and Pratt (1996) referred
to this type of behavior as risk vulnerability and showed that all weakly decreas-
ing absolute risk averse utility functions are risk vulnerable. This class includes
many popular characterizations of risk attitudes, such as constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).5
Although the notion of risk vulnerability is intuitively appealing, it is at odds
with the spirit of psychological work that provides evidence of diminishing sen-
sitivity. This is the notion that if the agent is already at a point of sufficiently
high risk, she will not pay particular attention to the addition of a small inde-
pendent risk. Making use of the concept of constant risk aversion presented by
Safra and Segal (1998), Quiggin (2003) showed that the premium for a given
risk is always reduced by the presence of independent background risk. Thus,
in this setting, aversion to one risk is reduced by the addition of an independent
background risk. Rather than arguing that independent risks are substitutes, as
in the standard expected utility framework, Quiggin (2003) showed that they
are complements in a set of alternative models. Of course, what constitutes a
“sufficiently high initial risk” and a “small independent risk” is in the eyes of
the beholder.6
Our main conclusion is that the use of artificial monetary prizes provides
a reliable measure of risk attitudes when the natural counterpart outcome has
minimal uncertainty,7 but that it can provide an unreliable measure in a natural
4For example, see Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987), Pratt (1988), Kimball (1993), Gollier, and
Pratt (1996), and Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (1996).
5Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (1996) extended these results by providing the necessary
and sufficient conditions on the characterization of risk aversion to ensure that any increase in
background risk induces more risk aversion.
6The theoretical literature provides few insights when background risk is added in the case of
risk loving preferences. A slight modification of the Quiggin (2003) analysis of constant risk aver-
sion with risk loving behavior preserves the property of diminishing sensitivity (i.e., preferences
will be closer to risk neutrality in the presence of independent background risk). For expected
utility preferences, the theory is less clear-cut.
7Lusk and Coble (2005) reported evidence consistent with this conclusion, comparing risk pref-
erences elicited for an artificial monetary instrument and comparable preferences for an instru-
ment defined over genetically modified food.
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context when the natural counterpart outcome has background risk.8 These re-
sults are consistent with the available theory from conventional expected utility
theory (EUT) for the effects of background risk on attitudes to risk.
Another important inference gained from these results concerns the applica-
bility of laboratory results to the field. The good news for the relevance of find-
ings from previous laboratory studies is that there is little evidence to suggest
that risk attitudes vary significantly due to the nature of the commodity. Yet,
tempering this optimism is the fact that the observed risk posture depends crit-
ically on the level of background risk, a multidimensional phenomenon that
has yet to be extensively explored in the lab. This empirical insight calls into
question the generalizability of the extant literature purporting to measure risk
attitudes in the lab and the field if they fail to measure or control for the po-
tential confound of background risk. It is not the case that field estimates of
risk attitudes are correct and lab estimates are inherently flawed: both are con-
ditional on assumptions made about background risk and other theoretically
relevant variables. However, it is the case that eliciting risk attitudes in a nat-
ural field setting requires one to consider the nature and degree of background
risk, because it is inappropriate to ignore.
To make this point more succinctly, consider the elicitation of the value that
a person places on safety, a critical input in the cost–benefit assessment of en-
vironmental policy such as the Clean Air Act (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (1997)). Conventional procedures to measure such preferences focus
on monetary values to avoid mortality risk by asking subjects to value scenarios
in which they face different risks of death. The traditional interpretation of re-
sponses to such questions ignores the fact that it is hard to imagine a physical
risk that could kill you with some probability but that would leave you alive
and have no effect whatsoever on your health. Of course, such risks exist, but
most of the environmental risks of concern for policy do not fall into such a
category. In general, then, responses to the foreground risk question should
allow for the fact that the subject likely perceived some background risk. This
example represents an important policy issue and highlights the import of the
theoretical literature on background risk.
A further virtue of extending lab procedures to the field, therefore, is to
encourage richer lab designs by forcing the analyst to account for realistic fea-
tures of the natural environment that have been placed aside. In virtually any
market with asymmetric information, whether it is a coins market, an open air
market, or a stock exchange, a central issue is the quality of the object being
traded. This issue, and attendant uncertainty, arises naturally. In many mar-
kets, the grade of the object, or professional certification of the seller, is one of
8Lusk and Coble (2007) found that adding abstract background risk to an elicitation procedure
using artificial monetary outcomes also generates more risk aversion, although they did not find
the effect to be large quantitatively. Our results do not address the effect of background risk on
attitudes in a lab context.
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the critical variables that determine price. Thus one could scarcely design a test
of foreground risk in these markets without attending to the background risk.
In our field experiment we exploit the fact that such risks can be exogenously
controlled in these settings, and in a manner consistent with the predictions of
theory.9
A final insight is that we observe considerable individual heterogeneity in
risk attitudes, such that one should not readily assume homogeneous risk pref-
erences for the population. This heterogeneity is also correlated with observ-
able characteristics of the individual. These results are consistent with those
from laboratory experiments in college settings and in the field using artificial
monetary prizes.
In Section 1, we review the standard lab procedures used to elicit risk aver-
sion. In Section 2, we propose a field counterpart. In Section 3, we discuss the
empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
1. ESTIMATING RISK AVERSION IN THE LABORATORY
There are several popular ways in which one can measure risk aversion
in the laboratory. One is by eliciting the certainty-equivalent of a given lot-
tery using open-ended valuation procedures such as a Vickrey auction or the
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) procedure (e.g., Harrison (1986) and
Kachelmeir and Shehata (1992)). The other is by observing choices that sub-
jects make over lotteries that vary the prizes offered for given probabilities
(e.g., Binswanger (1980, 1981)) or varying the probabilities of winning given
prizes (e.g., Holt and Laury (2002)). We utilize the latter method, because it
has been widely implemented in recent laboratory experiments and involves
a relatively transparent task. We limit ourselves to characterization of risks
framed in terms of gains.
Holt and Laury (2002) (HL) devised a simple experimental measure for risk
aversion using a multiple price list design. Each subject is presented with a
choice between two lotteries, which we denote A or B. Table I illustrates the
basic payoff matrix presented to subjects. The first row shows that lottery A
offered a 10% chance of receiving $2 and a 90% chance of receiving $1.60.
The expected value of this lottery (EVA), is shown in the third to last column
as $1.64, although the EV columns were not presented to subjects. Similarly,
lottery B in the first row has payoffs of $3.85 and $0.10, for an expected value
of $0.48. Thus, the two lotteries have a relatively large difference in expected
9However, because we do not know the subject probability distribution of background risk in
the field, we cannot know if background risk is statistically independent of the foreground risk.
We can think of no reason why the two might be correlated, but this illustrates again the type of
trade-off one experiences with field experiments. It also points to the complementary nature of
field and lab experiments: Lusk and Coble (2007) showed that independent background risk in a
lab setting is associated with an increase in foreground risk aversion.
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TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX IN THE HOLT AND LAURY RISK AVERSION EXPERIMENTS
Lottery A Lottery B Open CRRA Interval if
Subject Switches to
Lottery Bp($2) Outcome p($1.60) Outcome p($3.85) Outcome p($0.10) Outcome EV
A EVB Difference
0.1 $2 09 $1.60 01 $3.85 09 $0.10 $1.64 $0.48 $117 −∞, −095
0.2 $2 08 $1.60 02 $3.85 08 $0.10 $1.68 $0.85 $083 −∞, −095
0.3 $2 07 $1.60 03 $3.85 07 $0.10 $1.72 $1.23 $049 −0.95, −0.49
0.4 $2 06 $1.60 04 $3.85 06 $0.10 $1.76 $1.60 $016 −0.49, −0.15
0.5 $2 05 $1.60 05 $3.85 05 $0.10 $1.80 $1.98 −$017 −0.15, 0.14
0.6 $2 04 $1.60 06 $3.85 04 $0.10 $1.84 $2.35 −$051 0.14, 0.41
0.7 $2 03 $1.60 07 $3.85 03 $0.10 $1.88 $2.73 −$084 0.41, 0.68
0.8 $2 02 $1.60 08 $3.85 02 $0.10 $1.92 $3.10 −$118 0.68, 0.97
0.9 $2 01 $1.60 09 $3.85 01 $0.10 $1.96 $3.48 −$152 0.97, 1.37
1 $2 0 $1.60 1 $3.85 0 $0.10 $2.00 $3.85 −$185 1.37, ∞
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values, in this case $1.17. As one proceeds down the matrix, the expected value
of both lotteries increases, but the expected value of lottery B becomes greater
than the expected value of lottery A.
The subject chooses A or B in each row, and one row is later selected at
random for payout for that subject.10 The logic behind this test is that only risk
loving subjects would take lottery B in the first row and only risk averse subjects
would take lottery A in the penultimate row. Arguably, the last row is simply
a test that the subject understood the instructions: it has no relevance for risk
aversion. A risk neutral subject should switch from choosing A to B when the
EV of each is about the same, so a risk neutral subject would choose A for the
first four rows and B thereafter.
This procedure has now been widely employed in the laboratory. It has also
been employed in some artefactual field experiments, to use the terminology of
Harrison and List (2004) to indicate experiments that use laboratory proce-
dures and commodities with field subjects in an artificial setting. For example,
Harrison, Lau, Rutström, and Sullivan (2005) examined behavior of Danish
citizens confronted with an extension of the HL procedure. They found evi-
dence of risk aversion, in general, and considerable heterogeneity associated
with observable characteristics of the sample.
2. DESIGN OF THE FIELD EXPERIMENTS
2.1. General Design
Our objective is to evaluate risk aversion using a more natural representa-
tion of the elicitation task than previous laboratory experiments and to com-
pare the effect of that representation on elicited risk attitudes. To avoid order
effects that can easily confound inferences about risk attitudes, we employed
10As Laury (2005) noted, it has become increasingly common in economics experiments to
elicit a series of choices from participants and then pay for only one (selected at random). This
approach allows the researcher to observe a large number of individual decisions and to increase
payoffs for each decision because only one of them will be used for payment. An important ques-
tion then becomes, “Do subjects behave as if each of these choices involves the stated payoffs or
do subjects scale-down payoffs to account for the random selection that is made?” Laury (2005)
reported one laboratory experiment that tests this directly in an environment that shares similar-
ities with our experiment. In an environment where payoff scale effects have been demonstrated
to matter, three treatments are conducted: pay for 1 of 10 choices under low payoffs, pay for all 10
choices under low payoffs, and pay for 1 of 10 choices under 10× the low payoff level. Increasing
payoff scale has a significant effect on choices compared with the low payoff treatments where
all 10 decisions are paid or where one decision is paid. However, there is no significant differ-
ence in choices between paying for 1 or all 10 decisions at the low payoff level. Similar evidence
was reported by Starmer, and Sugden (1991) and Cubitt, Starmer, and Sugden (1998). Moreover,
we should note that this feature is common across all of our treatments. Thus one would have
to argue that there is an interaction effect with the treatments for it to be a confound for our
inferences.
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a between-subjects design. Our primary treatments reflect differences in the
nature of the prize being considered. Our secondary treatments reflect differ-
ences in the way in which the HL design was framed to subjects to detect any
“anchoring” biases in responses.
The primary treatments vary the commodity used as the prize. In the
money treatments, we follow the procedures of the laboratory experiments
and simply use monetary rewards as the prizes. This treatment parallels
the abstract lottery representation of the laboratory and serves as a con-
trol. In the graded coins treatment, we employ graded coins as the prize,
where higher grades would be expected to generate higher utility for individ-
uals in this sample, just as more money is expected to generate higher util-
ity in the abstract setting. To ensure control over the utility ranking of each
prize, we employ different grades of the same coin in each lottery. Conve-
niently for this design, the grade is a scalar, typically from 1 to 70 as sub-
sequently discussed further. In the ungraded coins treatment, we employ ex-
actly the same graded commodity, but without certification of the grade.
Thus, we add “background risk” to the valuation of the lottery by removing
the grading information from graded commodities with known grades. This
adds additional, natural uncertainty to the lottery outcomes because the sub-
ject must additionally consider the possible grades that the prize might have.
Our design ensures that the ungraded prize is actually a mean-zero devia-
tion of the grade of the graded prize, because we were extremely careful
when removing the certification to avoid damage to the commodity. Grad-
ing is costly, albeit with a known and stable fee, so we also added a certifi-
cate for “a free grading” to each ungraded prize. These procedures provide
a controlled way to identify the effect of background risk in a natural man-
ner.
Our secondary treatment explicitly varies the skewness frame to detect if
subjects anchor in the middle of the multiple price list with which they are pre-
sented. We employ three variants. In the symmetric frame, we allow the prob-
abilities of the two lotteries to increment by a constant 5 percentage points
from row to row. Thus a risk neutral subject would switch from option A to
option B roughly in the middle of the table. In the lower frame we have smaller
increments in the probability for risk loving choices than we do for risk averse
choices, such that a risk neutral subject should switch lower in the table than
in the symmetric frame, at least in the absence of any anchoring effect. Con-
versely for the higher frame, the risk neutral subject should switch higher up the
table than in the symmetric frame if there are no anchoring effects. We name
these frames to reflect the bias in elicited risk attitudes that they are intended
to induce if there is anchoring behavior.
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2.2. Specific Design
The specific rare coin that we employ is a U.S. silver dollar known as the
Morgan dollar.11 These were primarily minted between 1878 and 1921 in the
Philadelphia and San Francisco mints, and between 1878 and 1904 in the New
Orleans mint.12 All were struck in 0.900 fine silver and were extremely popular
in the wild West, adding to their appeal to collectors. To ensure control, we
only use 1897 coins minted from San Francisco, known in the trade as “1879-S
Morgans,” pictured in Figure 1.
Coins are graded using a relatively common 1-to-70 classification scheme.13
This scheme originated with the numismatist William Sheldon in 1948. His
original objective, interestingly, was to develop a “ratio scale” of value, such
that a coin graded as a 70 would be worth 70 times a coin graded as a 1. In
1986 the Sheldon scale was formalized by the Professional Coin Grading Ser-
11The expression “Morgan dollar” is a common term used for the liberty head silver dollar
struck from 1878 until 1904, and again briefly in 1921. George Morgan was the assistant engraver
at the time the coin was first struck, but his design was selected over the design of William Barber
for the dollar. Morgan was passed over for the job of Chief Engraver when William Barber died
in 1879 (the job actually went to Charles Barber, William’s son). However, Morgan became the
next Chief Engraver in 1918, a position he held until his death in 1925.
12Some very rare Morgans were minted in Denver in 1921, and in Carson City between 1878
and 1893. The mint is readily identified by a mark just above and between the “D” and “O” in the
“DOLLAR” imprinted on one side. For the Philadelphia mint, there is no mint mark, and for the
San Francisco mint, there is an “S” mark.
13These are: PO-1, identifiable date and type; FR-2, mostly worn, though some detail is vis-
ible; AG-3, worn rims but most lettering is readable though worn; G-4, slightly worn rims, flat
detail, peripheral lettering nearly full; G-6, rims complete with flat detail, peripheral lettering
full; VG-8, design worn with slight detail; VG-10, design worn with slight detail, slightly clearer;
F-12, some deeply recessed areas with detail, all lettering sharp; F-15, slightly more detail in the
recessed areas, all lettering sharp; VF-20, some definition of detail, all lettering full and sharp;
VF-25, slightly more definition in the detail and lettering; VF-30, almost complete detail with flat
areas; VF-35, detail is complete but worn with high points flat; EF-40, detail is complete with
most high points slightly flat; EF-45, detail is complete with some high points flat; AU-50, full
detail with friction over most of the surface, slight flatness on high points; AU-53, full detail with
friction over 1/2 or more of surface, very slight flatness on high points; AU-55, full detail with
friction on less than 1/2 surface, mainly on high points; AU-58, full detail with only slight friction
on the high points; MS/PR-60, no wear, may have many heavy marks/hairlines, strike may not
be full; MS/PR-61, no wear, multiple heavy marks/hairlines, strike may not be full; MS/PR-62,
no wear, slightly less marks/hairlines, strike may not be full; MS/PR-63, moderate number/size
marks/hairlines, strike may not be full; MS/PR-64, few marks/hairlines or a couple of severe ones,
strike should be average or above; MS/PR-65, minor marks/hairlines though none in focal ar-
eas, above average strike; MS/PR-66, few minor marks/hairlines not in focal areas, good strike;
MS/PR-67, virtually as struck with minor imperfections, very well struck; MS/PR-68, virtually
as struck with slight imperfections, slightest weakness of strike allowed; MS/PR-69, virtually as
struck with minuscule imperfections, near full strike necessary; MS/PR-70, as struck, with full
strike; GV, government issue price. In addition, designations exist for color (RD, red; RB, red–
brown; BN, brown), “strike” (FS, full steps; FB, full bands; FH, full head; FBL, full bell lines;
CA, cameo; and BM, branch mint proof) and surface (DM, deep mirror prooflike; PL, prooflike;
DC, deep cameo).
442 G. W. HARRISON, J. A. LIST, AND C. TOWE
FIGURE 1.—A Morgan silver dollar.
vice (PCGS), a private company of coin collectors wanting to establish a thick
market in rare coins.14 They employed the “cardinal scale” proposed by Shel-
don and dropped the presumption that it also reflected relative value. Since
then the PCGS has established a dominant position in the coin grading market
and has graded almost 9 million coins worth roughly $11.3 billion.
14Web page http://www.pcgs.com contains information on the grading scales employed, his-
torical background to the grading schemes, and prices on many rare coins including the 1897
Morgans. Coins graded by PCGS can be verified at http://www.pcgs.com/verify.chtml.
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The specific coins we employ are MS/PR-63, MS/PR-65, MS/PR-65PL, and
MS/PR-66, with retail values of $40, $125, $200, and $350 at the time of the
experiment.15 These grades are defined as follows:
• MS/PR-63: Moderate number/size marks/hairlines; strike may not be full.
• MS/PR-65: Minor marks/hairlines, though none in focal areas; above aver-
age strike.
• MS/PR-65PL: Minor marks/hairlines, though none in focal areas; above av-
erage strike, with a prooflike surface.
• MS/PR-66: Few minor marks/hairlines not in focal areas; good strike.
These grades were provided by PCGS and the coins were sealed in a protec-
tive cover. This cover can be “cracked,” but it is effectively tamper-proof if one
wants to leave the official certification in place. The image shown in Figure 2
illustrates a PCGS-graded Morgan dollar. The circled number is a sonically
sealed certification number, which can be entered on the PCGS web site to
FIGURE 2.—Graded Morgan silver dollar.
15Retail values were obtained from the PCGS web site, http://www.pcgs.com, just prior to the
show. Excluding shipping and insurance, which would not be relevant at a show, we purchased 12
coins worth $2,166 on the open market just prior to the show. The retail values for these coins
were $2,105, so our average costs were 2.9% above retail. On average, we paid 11%, 3%, and 21%
over retail for the MS63, MS65, and MS65PL coins, and 8% under retail for the MS66 coins.
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verify the date, mint mark, denomination, variety, and grade. In our experi-
ence, virtually any serious coin collector in the United States would be familiar
with this grading system.
Our procedures were to set up a stall at a major coin show, The Central
Florida Coin Show, held April 16–18, 2004, at the Orlando Expo Center. We
offered subjects $5 to participate in an experiment. In most of our previous
field experiments we have not used such a participation fee, but we wanted to
ensure a relatively large sample size and to ask relatively more survey questions
to better characterize the individual.16
After subjects agreed to participate and completed the consent form, we
presented them with the instructions for the risk aversion task and one of the
nine payoff tables that reflected our 3 × 3 design. We randomized the money,
graded coins, and ungraded coins treatments every hour, over the three days
of the show.17
Figure 3 shows the effect of the anchoring treatment in which we varied the
probabilities associated with each row. The symmetric frame has 20 decision
rows in which the probability of the high prize outcome in each lottery option
increases by a fixed 0.05 in each row. One can use CRRA values to characterize
the switch point in each row, following Holt and Laury (2002, Table 3, p. 1649).
The associated CRRA values for each switch point range from a risk loving
−2.98 to a risk averse 2.50, with risk neutrality corresponding to a switch from
option A to option B around row 7, which is the proximate midpoint of the
decision table actually presented to subjects.
The “low frame” changes the probabilities so that the risk neutral switch
point occurs at a later, or lower, point in the decision table: at rows 10 or 11.
Conversely, the “high frame” changes the probabilities so that the risk-neutral
switch point occurs at an earlier, or higher, point in the decision table: at rows
2 or 3.18 The objective is to generate some separation in the observed row
choices under the hypothesis that subjects are simply picking a row that is close
to the middle of the table, rather than according to the implied risk aversion
of that row. Even if subjects do not pick exactly in the middle, these frames
16In addition, given our design, we must admit to responding to some background risk. Al-
though experienced at sports card and related shows, this was the first coin show that in which we
had participated. The older demographics we expected in our sample led us to be cautious that
subjects would be as willing to participate in such an activity as we have experienced in sports
card markets. On the other hand, casual evidence from show activity indicates that coin shows
are currently booming, much as sports card markets did in the 1980s and early 1990s.
17Given the vagaries of hourly attendance and a desire to have roughly balanced samples in
each treatment cell, we did not elicit responses for the ungraded coins treatment on the third day
of the show. We find no differences in observed risk posture over the three days.
18The probabilities for the low frame are 0.06, 0.1, 0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.2, 0.24, 0.26, 0.3, 0.34,
0.36, 0.4, 0.44, 0.46, 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.64, 0.66, and 0.7. The probabilities for the high frame are 0.3,
0.35, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.54, 0.56, 0.6, 0.64, 0.66, 0.7, 0.74, 0.76, 0.8, 0.84, 0.86, 0.9, 0.94, and 0.96.
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FIGURE 3.—Effect of anchoring treatment.
may reveal a behavioral pull in that direction. For this to occur in a statistically
detectable manner, one needs to have several rows of separation.19
The instructions given to subjects were virtually identical across treatments.
In the baseline case—the money treatment with a symmetric frame—they were
as follows:
On the next page there is a decision sheet and each decision is a paired choice between
OPTION A and OPTION B. You will make twenty choices and record these in the final
column. Before you start making your twenty choices, let me explain how these choices
will affect your potential earnings.
Even though you will make twenty decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your
earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. After completing
the twenty choices you will roll a 20-sided die; the result corresponds to the row from the
decision sheet you will play. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in
the end.
Once the row has been selected we will use a 100-sided die to play the option A or B
corresponding to your decision on the selected row. The final result will be written on
the game sheet and an index card which you will add to the raffle box. A raffle will be
19The design of Harrison, Lau, Rutström, and Sullivan (2005) may have failed to detect a large
effect because to their initial decision sheet had only 10 rows and, hence, only a separation of 2
rows in their comparable frames.
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conducted on Sunday at 2pm to determine the participants that will receive payment. You
will have a 1/20 chance of winning the prize on the index card which is the result from the
upcoming game.20 You need not be present to win, we will mail the prize to you.
Now, let’s discuss the decision sheet. Please look at Decision 1 at the top of the decision
sheet:
OPTION A pays $200 if the die shows a number between 1 and 5. It pays $125 if the die
shows between 6 and 100.
OPTION B yields $350 if the die shows a number between 1 and 5. It pays $40 if the die
shows between 6 and 100.
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the
higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 20 in the bottom row, the die
will not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here
is between $200 and $350.21
So now please look at the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You will have
to write a decision, A or B in each of these boxes, and then a roll of the dice will determine
which choice will count. We will look at the decision that you made for the choice that
counts, and circle it, before rolling a die again to determine your potential earnings. Then
you will write your potential earnings in the blank at the bottom of the page.
Are there any questions?
In the coins treatment, references to $200, $125, $350, and $40 were replaced
by coin A, coin B, coin C, and coin D, respectively. In that case, the subjects
were shown the coins. The first three lines of the decision sheet for the money
treatment appeared as follows:
Option A Option B Decision
1 5/100 of $200, 95/100 of $125 5/100 of $350, 95/100 of $40 A B
2 10/100 of $200, 90/100 of $125 10/100 of $350, 90/100 of $40 A B
3 15/100 of $200, 85/100 of $125 15/100 of $350, 85/100 of $40 A B
The comparable lines for the coins treatment were the following:
Option A Option B Decision
1 5/100 of COIN A, 95/100 of COIN B 5/100 of COIN C, 95/100 of COIN D A B
2 10/100 of COIN A, 90/100 of COIN B 10/100 of COIN C, 90/100 of COIN D A B
3 15/100 of COIN A, 85/100 of COIN B 15/100 of COIN C, 85/100 of COIN D A B
20We implemented this random draw by adding a prize every time the number of subjects
exceeded a multiple of 20. In fact, we had 6 prizes, so each of the 113 subjects actually had a
0.053 chance of winning.
21The reference in these instructions to Decision 20 was actually typed as Decision 10 in the
instructions provided. This was an error from an earlier version of the decision sheet. The experi-
menters corrected this orally during the experiment, noting that it was a typo because the bottom
row was of course row 20. No subject appeared concerned with this typo.
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All responses were collected by “paper and pencil,” and an identification for
each subject was placed in a visible, sealed glass jar until the drawing near the
end of the show.
After these decisions were made, we asked each subject to complete a short
survey for information about themselves. We asked several questions to char-
acterize the depth of their experience in the coin market. Specifically, we asked
how long they had been active in the coin and paper money market; whether
they were a coin and paper money professional dealer; how many coin and pa-
per money shows they attend in a typical year; how many of their coins had
been professionally graded in a given year; whether they dealt only in graded
coins, only in ungraded coins, or in both; and whether they were affiliated with
a grading company. We also asked for the sex, age, educational level, income,
marital status, size of household, and smoking status of the subject.
Responses from 113 subjects were collected: 42 in the money treatment, 38
in the graded coins treatment, and 33 in the ungraded coins treatment. Subjects
were successfully randomized to the anchoring frame.22
3. RESULTS
Over all 2,260 binary choices, 48.5% were for the safe lottery. In the money
treatment, we observed 43.6% of the choices for the safe lottery, whereas in the
graded coins treatment, we observed 51.8% safe choices and in the ungraded
coins treatment, we observed 51.1% safe choices. These choices are not inde-
pendent, of course, because each subject made 20 binary choices. Furthermore,
we have an anchoring frame that varies from subject to subject. However, these
raw responses do tentatively suggest that there was an increase in risk aversion
when we compare the coins treatments to the money treatment, and that there
was virtually no difference between risk attitudes elicited in the graded coins
and ungraded coins treatments.
To go beyond this casual evidence, we require some economic structure and
statistical structure. We describe each informally and formally, and then dis-
cuss estimation results. We discover that the unconditional inferences from
the raw results are misleading with respect to the graded coins treatment: the
graded coins and money treatments elicited comparable risk attitudes, and the
ungraded coins treatment elicited responses consistent with greater risk aver-
sion than either of the other two.
22In fact we had 19, 12, and 11 subjects from the money treatment in each of low-skew, symmet-
ric, and high-skew anchoring frames, respectively; 10, 10, and 18 in the graded coins treatment;
and 12, 11, and 10 in the ungraded coins treatment. A Fisher exact test of the null hypothesis
of independence of treatment and frame has a p-value of 0.29. Nonetheless, we control for the
frames in our statistical analysis because we do have more of the low-skew subjects in the money
treatment, and more of the high-skew subjects in the graded coins treatment, and we want to
avoid those sampling differences as a possible confound.
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3.1. Informal Specification Assumptions
The economic structure we need is provided by specifying a parametric
CRRA utility function and some assumptions about the relationship between
utility and choices. One natural assumption for this relationship is EUT: that
the subjects took the stated probabilities of the foreground risk task as the
decision weights to calculate expected utility in the standard manner. Another
natural assumption is prospect theory (PT): that the subjects used some proba-
bility weighting function to transform the stated probabilities of the foreground
risk task into decision weights that are then used to calculate expected util-
ity (sometimes called prospective utility). To simplify, we assume the single-
parameter probability weighting function used by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), recognizing that there are more flexible functional forms available.23
The statistical structure we need is provided by allowing for a “stochastic er-
ror” in choices, correcting for the fact that sampling errors may be clustered
for the same subject and specifying a likelihood function that relates latent
specifications of preferences to observed choices. The stochastic error specifi-
cation we adopt allows the subject to make an error when they are comparing
the expected utility of the two lotteries and follows the “Fechner” specifica-
tion employed by Hey and Orme (1994) in their analysis of comparable binary
choices.24 We assume that the responses from the same subject might be clus-
tered and we correct for unobserved individual effects using methods that are
standard in the statistical survey literature.25 We allow the parameters of the
statistical model to be linear functions of observable characteristics of the in-
dividual and task, because our design is between subjects in terms of the treat-
ments of interest.
23We adopt the “separable prospect theory” of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), rather than
the later cumulative prospect theory. Given the structure of our decision problem, with only two
prizes in each lottery and no losses, the differences are likely to be minor.
24See Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) for a methodological review of this development, which
builds on an earlier tradition started by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1963). There are alter-
native error specifications, depending on the stage of the latent decision process that one assumes
the error to occur. Hey (1995), Carbone (1998), and Loomes and Sugden (1998) reviewed the al-
ternatives.
25Clustering commonly arises in national field surveys from the fact that physically proximate
households are often sampled to save time and money, but it can also arise from more homely
sampling procedures. For example, Williams (2000, p. 645) noted that it could arise from dental
studies that “collect data on each tooth surface for each of several teeth from a set of patients” or
“repeated measurements or recurrent events observed on the same person.” The procedures that
allow for clustering allow heteroscedasticity between and within clusters, as well as autocorrela-
tion within clusters. They are closely related to the “generalized estimating equations” approach
to panel estimation in epidemiology (see Liang and Zeger (1986)), and generalize the “robust
standard errors” approach popular in econometrics (see Rogers (1986)). Wooldridge (2003) re-
viewed some issues in the use of clustering for panel effects, in particular noting that significant
inferential problems may arise with small numbers of panels.
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3.2. Formal Specification Assumptions
The most popular functional form for the characterization of risk attitudes
has been the CRRA specification, assuming a standard EUT decision process.
We first specify the latent structural model implied by that specification. We
then consider two extensions to allow for (i) prospect theory and probability
weighting in the latent process, and (ii) the possibility that subjects might be
making decisions with something other than the lottery prizes as arguments of
their utility function.
The base case under EUT
Utility is defined by the standard function
U(m)=m1−r/(1 − r)(1)
where r is the CRRA coefficient and m is the monetary value of the lottery
prize. With this parameterization, r = 0 denotes risk neutral behavior, r > 0 de-
notes risk aversion, and r < 0 denotes risk loving. When r = 1, U(m)= ln(m).
We estimate the CRRA parameter using maximum likelihood applied to the
binary choices made by each subject. Probabilities for each outcome kn, p(kn),
are those induced by the experimenter, so expected utility is then simply the
probability weighted utility of each outcome in each lottery. Given that there
were two outcomes in each lottery, the EU for lottery i is
EUi =
∑
n
[p(kn)×U(kn)](2)
for n= 12. The EU for each lottery pair is calculated for a candidate estimate
of r, and the difference
∇EU = EUA − EUB(3)
is calculated, where EUA is the left lottery in the display and EUB is the right
lottery.
The subject is assumed to make some structural error in the comparison of
the EU of the two lotteries. Let this error ε be normally distributed with zero
mean and standard deviation σ . Then, if (·) is the standard normal cumula-
tive distribution function, it follows26 that the likelihood is ((EUA −EUB)/σ)
if A is chosen, and 1−((EUA −EUB)/σ) if B is chosen. Thus σ is a structural
26If the subject does not make mistakes, then lottery A is chosen if EUA − EUB > 0; otherwise
B is chosen. If the subject makes measurement errors, denoted by ε, then the decision is made
on the basis of the value of EUA − EUB + ε. That is, A is chosen if EUA − EUB + ε > 0; oth-
erwise B is chosen. If ε is random, then the probability that A is chosen is P(EUA − EUB + ε >
0) = P(ε > −(EUA − EUB)). Because ε is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and
standard deviation σ , it follows that Z = ε/σ is normally distributed with mean 0 and stan-
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“noise parameter” used to allow some errors from the perspective of the deter-
ministic EUT model. As σ → 0 this specification collapses to the deterministic
choice EUT model, where the choice is strictly determined by the EU of the
two lotteries, but as σ gets larger the choice essentially becomes random.
The likelihood of the risk aversion responses, conditional on the EUT and
CRRA specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r and σ given the
preceding statistical specification and the observed choices. The log-likelihood
is
lnLEUT(rσ; yX)(4)
=
∑
i
[(
ln((∇EU)/σ)|yi = 1
)+ (ln(1 −(∇EU)/σ)|yi = 0
)]

where yi = 1 (0) denotes the choice of lottery A (B) in risk aversion task
i and X is a vector of individual characteristics.
We allow each parameter to be a linear function of the characteristics of
the subject or the task. This is the X vector referenced in the foregoing text.
Our most important treatment variables are whether the task involved a coin
(COIN) or whether it involved an ungraded coin and, hence, added back-
ground risk (BRISK), so the implicit control is the task using money. The
estimates of each parameter in the aforementioned likelihood function entail
estimation of the coefficients of a linear function of these characteristics. Thus,
if we included these two characteristics, the estimate of r, rˆ, would actually be
rˆ = rˆ0 + (rˆCOIN × COIN)+ (rˆBRISK × BRISK)(5)
where rˆ0 is the estimate of the constant, normalized on the money treatment.
We also include other task and subject characteristics in our estimation that
are subsequently explained. If we collapse this specification by dropping all
characteristics, then we would simply be estimating the constant terms for each
of r and σ .
Prospect theory
For the “value function” of PT we use the same CRRA functional form spec-
ified for EUT:
U(x)= (x1−α)/(1 − α)(6)
dard deviation 1: Z has a unit normal distribution. Hence the probability that A is chosen is
P(ε > −(EUA − EUB)) = P(ε/σ > −(EUA − EUB)/σ). It follows that the probability that A
is chosen is 1 − (−(EUA − EUB)/σ) = ((EUA − EUB)/σ), because the distribution is sym-
metrical about 0. Hence the probability that B is chosen is given by (−(EUA − EUB)/σ) =
1 −((EUA − EUB)/σ). We implicitly assume that the probability that the subject is indifferent
is zero.
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We do not have any losses in the lotteries considered here, so we drop the
part of the utility function in PT that is defined over losses.27 We use the prob-
ability weighting function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), which
implies decision weights
w(p)= pγ/[pγ + (1 −p)γ]1/γ(7)
for 0 <p< 1. The parameter γ determines the curvature of the function.28 As-
suming that PT is the true model, prospective utility (PU) is defined in much
the same manner as when EUT is assumed to be the true model. The PT utility
function (6) is used instead of the EUT utility function (1) and w(p) is used in-
stead of p, but the steps are otherwise identical. The difference in prospective
utilities is defined similarly as
∇PU = PUA − PUB(8)
and the same Fechner noise specification is assumed to apply, with error term
φ instead of σ . Thus the likelihood, conditional on the PT model being true,
depends on the estimates of α, γ, and φ given the foregoing specification and
the observed choices. The log-likelihood is
lnLPT(αγφ; yX)(9)
=
∑
i
[(
ln((∇PU/φ))|yi = 1
)+ (ln(1 −(∇PU)/φ)|yi = 0
)]

The parameters α, γ, and φ can again be estimated, in principle, as linear
functions of the vector X .
27To be accurate, we did not frame any of the prizes as negative numbers, which would make
them losses relative to a reference point of zero. If the subject arrived at the experiment expecting
some average level of earnings per task, prizes that implied a lower earning might be subjectively
framed as a loss. We assume that this is not the case and that all subjects implicitly used zero as
their reference point. In fact, when we imposed nonnegative reference points between $0 and $4
in $0.10 increments, and extended the statistical model to estimate the degree of loss aversion
relative to any positive reference point, the likelihood of the model is maximized at $0. Thus we
believe it appropriate to assume a reference point of zero in this field setting. Andersen, Harrison,
and Rutström (2006) examined this issue in greater depth using traditional laboratory experi-
ments. Unlike our field experiments, subjects in that setting have some experience with earning
substantial positive rewards for much longer tasks. They elicited subjects’ beliefs about expected
earnings for the session, which averaged roughly $30. However, when they estimated an endoge-
nous “homegrown reference point” with the full structure of a prospect theory model that also
allows for loss aversion, the estimate was only $1.11 per lottery choice, with a 95% confidence
interval between $0.43 and $1.80.
28The normal assumption, backed by a substantial amount of evidence reviewed by Gonza-
lez and Wu (1999), is that 0 < γ < 1. This gives the weighting function an “inverse S shape,”
characterized by a concave section that signifies the overweighting of small probabilities up to
a crossover point where w(p) = p, beyond which there is then a convex section that signifies
underweighting. If γ > 1 the function takes the less conventional “S shape,” with convexity for
smaller probabilities and concavity for larger probabilities.
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The arguments of utility
There is a debate about the arguments of the utility function. Our view is that
one is free to define utility over virtually anything, such as final states of nature,
lottery prizes, income, or wealth at some point in time. This view is consistent
with the analyses specified previously in which the argument is assumed to be
the lottery prize offered to subjects. However, it is also possible to resolve this
issue empirically by extending the earlier analysis to estimate the argument of
the utility function.29 Specifically, modify (1) to be
U(ω+m)= (ω+m)1−r/(1 − r)(1′)
and include ω as a parameter to be estimated in the likelihood function (4).
If ω is close to zero, then there is empirical support for the view that subjects
behave as if maximizing a utility function defined over lottery prizes.
3.3. Estimates
Table II contains maximum likelihood estimates of the EUT specification
applied to our data. We include several characteristics in binary form to ac-
count for some of the heterogeneity of responses in risk attitudes. Each is self-
explanatory from the description in Table II. One likely source of noise was
observed a priori during the experiment: many of the female respondents were
spouses of male dealers and did not appear to be as keen participants in the
market as their spouses. We therefore allow for this as a control in the esti-
mation of the noise parameter σ . In addition, we also control for potentially
confounding effects of the skewness treatments and differences in individual
characteristics across treatment samples.
The most important result from Table II is that there is a significant ef-
fect from the ungraded coins treatment. The constant term shows the esti-
mated CRRA under the money treatment: an estimate of 0.951 indicates that
individuals are moderately risk averse. There is no statistically significant dif-
ference with graded coins: the CRRA coefficient is 0.160 lower than the treat-
ment with money, but the effect is statistically insignificant, with a p-value
of 0.794. However, the effect of ungraded coins and background risk is to in-
crease elicited risk aversion dramatically. The coefficient estimate of 3.974 in
Table II is clearly statistically significant. To our surprise, given our priors from
related markets, there appears to be no interaction between this striking effect
of background risk and whether the subject was a dealer.
The economic significance of these results can be illustrated by considering
a simple lottery in which outcomes of $10, $20, or $30 occur with equal proba-
bility. Hence the expected value of the lottery is $20. If we assume that utility
is defined solely in terms of the lottery prizes, CRRA values of 0.88, 0.76, and
29Heinemann (2007) and Andersen, Harrison, and Rutström (2006) developed this approach.
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TABLE II
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR EUT SPECIFICATION
Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
r Constant 0951 0444 0.032 0080 1822
Coins as final outcomes −0160 0610 0.794 −1356 1036
Ungraded coins as final outcomes 3974 0744 0.000 2517 5431
Frame to skew RA lower 0756 0400 0.059 −0027 1539
Frame to skew RA higher 0142 0299 0.634 −0443 0728
Female −1259 0712 0.077 −2654 0136
College education or higher 0044 0209 0.832 −0366 0455
Single and never married 0838 0379 0.027 0094 1582
Ever owned Morgan silver dollars 0032 0573 0.956 −1092 1156
Coin dealer −0984 0597 0.099 −2153 0185
Dealer × coins as final outcome 0394 0473 0.405 −0533 1320
Affiliated with a grading company −0124 0284 0.661 −0680 0432
σ Constant 0408 0734 0.578 −1030 1847
Female 12534 38278 0.743 −62490 87558
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FIGURE 4.—Distribution of risk attitudes by treatment: the kernel density of predicted CRRA
an using Epanichnikov kernel.
4.78 imply that the certainty equivalent would be $18.40, $18.62, and $13.08, or
92%, 93%, and 65% of the expected value.
Another way to study the effects of different types of coins is to use the max-
imum likelihood estimates to predict CRRA for each subject and to show the
density of predicted CRRA by treatment. Figure 4 shows these estimated den-
sities, confirming the clear finding from Table II of a marked increase in risk
aversion when we allow for background risk. With this procedure, we predict
that the CRRA is 0.88 in the money treatment, 0.76 in the graded coins treat-
ment, and 4.78 in the ungraded coins treatment.
Thus we find a significant effect of the ungraded coins treatment and no
statistically significant effect from the graded coins treatment. These findings
indicate that the use of artificial monetary prizes provides a reliable measure of
risk attitudes when the natural counterpart outcome has minimal uncertainty, but
that it can provide an unreliable measure when the natural counterpart outcome
has background risk. These results are consistent with conventional EUT for
the effects of background risk.
The other characteristics have some effects on elicited risk attitudes. Women
exhibit less risk aversion in this setting, and those who have not enjoyed the
comfort of marriage exhibit more risk aversion (we choose not to speculate
on causality of this effect). Coin dealers are less risk averse in such tasks, as
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one might expect from their self-selection into a part-time or full-time occu-
pation that thrives on careful evaluation of risky prospects such as these. The
skewness frames have a mixed, and unexpected effect. The frame to skew risk
aversion (RA) higher has no appreciable effect, but the frame to skew RA
lower is associated with higher risk attitudes. We conjecture that the frame
may have actually triggered a “frame reaction,” in the sense that the prospects
may have appeared to be skewed to the subjects, leading them to overreact to
avoid responding to the frame.30
The prospect theory specification mitigates the quantitative effects of the treat-
ments, but does not change the main qualitative conclusions. For parsimony, we
only summarize the results here. The probability weighting parameter γ is esti-
mated to be 0.83, which is significantly less than 1 and consistent with previous
estimates from laboratory experiments. The effect of the graded coins treat-
ment on risk aversion is again statistically insignificant, after controlling for
the same characteristics used in Table II. The CRRA parameter α increases
by 0.65 with graded coins, but has p-value of 0.86. On the other hand, α in-
creases by 0.59 with ungraded coins, and has a standard error of only 0.18 and a
p-value of 0.001. The 95% confidence interval on this effect from background
risk is between +0.24 and +0.94, so the treatment effect magnitude is much
smaller than under EUT, but we find qualitatively similar insights.
Finally, there is striking evidence that subjects have lottery prizes as arguments
of their utility function under EUT. The parameter ω is estimated to be only
$0.037 on average, and to have a 95% confidence interval across subjects and
treatments between $0.023 and $0.052. This variation includes sampling error
as well as heterogeneity across subjects and tasks, and is very small. Again, this
is an “agnostic empirical argument” for this specification of the utility func-
tion, quite distinct from the theoretical issues discussed by Rabin (2000), Cox
and Sadiraj (2006), and Rubinstein (2002). The estimates of the effects of our
primary treatments on risk attitudes are virtually identical to the results in Ta-
ble II, where we assumed ω= 0 on an a priori basis.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Does individual behavior in a laboratory setting provide a reliable indi-
cator of behavior in a naturally occurring setting? We consider this general
methodological question in the context of eliciting risk attitudes. We find that
the use of artificial monetary prizes provides a reliable measure of risk at-
titudes when the natural counterpart outcome has minimal uncertainty, but
that it can provide an unreliable measure when the natural counterpart out-
come has background risk. These results are consistent with conventional EUT
30In these models we also explored empirically whether agents responded differently to the
treatments. We found little heterogeneous treatments effects across naïve and sophisticated
agents in our sample, so we suppress these results.
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for the effects of background risk on attitudes to risk. Behavior tended to be
slightly risk averse when artificial monetary prizes were used or when there
was minimal uncertainty in the natural nonmonetary outcome. However, sub-
jects drawn from the same population were quite risk averse when their at-
titudes were elicited using the natural nonmonetary outcome that had some
background risk.
The practical implications for policy are twofold. First, estimates of risk aver-
sion elicited using monetary outcomes may be reliable for nonmonetary out-
comes that do not involve a considerable amount of background risk. However,
they should not be applied directly to nonmonetary outcomes with significant
background risk. At the very least they should be viewed as lower-bound es-
timates, consistent with the predictions of standard theory about the effects
of background risk on risk attitudes.31 Second, one should not assume in wel-
fare evaluation under uncertainty that all individuals have the same attitudes
to risk. Consistent with laboratory evidence, we identify statistically significant
evidence that observable individual heterogeneity is correlated with risk at-
titudes. Thus one should apply appropriate measures of risk attitudes when
evaluating welfare impacts for different individuals or households.
These results highlight the suggestion that field experiments represent a use-
ful bridge between the lab and the field, providing a useful middle ground
between the tight controls of the laboratory and the vagaries of completely
uncontrolled field data. Such a bridge permits a discussion of the generaliz-
ability and overall applicability of experimental results from the lab. Indeed,
in transferring the insights gained in the laboratory with student subjects to
the field, a necessary first step is to explore how market professionals behave
in strategically similar situations. In this spirit, our treatments begin by focus-
ing on the representativeness of the sampled population to lend insights into
heterogeneity across subject pools. Much like student data, we find substantial
heterogeneity in our data.
A related issue concerns the representativeness of the environment. For ex-
ample, before we can begin to make reasonable arguments that behavior ob-
served in the lab is a good indicator of behavior in the field, we must explore
whether the other dimensions of the laboratory environment might cause dif-
ferences in behavior, including the abstract task, the stakes, the good, and the
institution. In this regard, we find that the nature of the environment is critical
in considering the general applicability of results from the lab. We find these
insights a necessary first step in the discovery process, and we hope that future
efforts will explore more fully other potentially important dimensions of the
controlled laboratory experiment.
31We certainly do not propose that the quantitative difference between our money and graded
treatments be used to calibrate between, say, money and health outcomes. Such calibration fac-
tors should be generated on a case-by-case basis for appropriate populations.
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